Does attending a charter school Reduce the likelihood of being placed into special education? Evidence from Denver, Colorado by Winters, Marcus A. et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
BU Open Access Articles BU Open Access Articles
2017-09-01
Does attending a charter school
Reduce the likelihood of being
placed into special educati...
This work was made openly accessible by BU Faculty. Please share how this access benefits you.
Your story matters.
Version Accepted manuscript
Citation (published version): Marcus A Winters, Dick M Carpenter, Grant Clayton. 2017. "Does
Attending a Charter School Reduce the Likelihood of Being Placed
Into Special Education? Evidence From Denver, Colorado."
EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS, Volume 39, Issue
3, pp. 448 - 463 (16).
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/27017
Boston University
0 
 
Does Attending a Charter School Reduce the Likelihood of Being Placed into Special 
Education? Evidence from Denver, Colorado 
 
 
Marcus A. Winters, Ph.D. 
Boston University 
 
Grant Clayton, Ph.D. 
University of Colorado Colorado Springs 
 
Dick Carpenter 
University of Colorado Colorado Springs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
We use administrative data to measure whether attending a charter school in Denver, Colorado 
reduces the likelihood that students are newly classified as having a disability in primary grades. We 
employ an observational approach that takes advantage of Denver’s Common Enrollment System, 
which allows us to observe each school that the student listed a preference to attend. We find 
evidence that attending a Denver charter school reduces the likelihood that a student is classified as 
having a Specific Learning Disability, which is the largest and most subjectively diagnosed disability 
category. We find no evidence that charter attendance reduces the probability of being classified as 
having a speech or language disability or autism, which are two more objectively diagnosed 
classifications.  
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Introduction 
 
Practically from the advent of charter schools, a primary concern focused on whether these 
publically funded but privately operated schools of choice were serving similar percentages of 
students with special needs as compared to surrounding district schools. In 1996, for example, 
which was just a few years after the first charter law was adopted in Minnesota, McKinney (1996) 
called charter schools “a new barrier for children with disabilities” (p. 22). Twenty years later, the 
same concerns were still being voiced in journals (Miron, 2014) and popular media (Banchero & 
Porter, 2012).  
 
Charter schools do appear, on average, to enroll significantly fewer students with disabilities than do 
surrounding district schools (Government Accountability Office, 2012; Snell, 2004; Winters, 2015b; 
see Heilig, 2016 for an exception). There are at least two reasons that this could be a policy concern. 
First and foremost is the issue of access. As public schools, charters are obligated to serve students 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and enrolling lower rates of students 
with disabilities suggests the possibility that they are neglecting this responsibility. Second, many 
complain that the fact that charter schools serve such different populations of students tends to 
exacerbate their observed performance relative to surrounding district schools. That is, charter 
schools may have an unfair advantage relative to district schools if they serve fewer students with 
disabilities, who are often more difficult and expensive to educate. 
 
There are three primary factors (with many variants within these factors) that could result in a 
smaller proportion of students with identified special needs enrolled in charter schools as compared 
to surrounding district schools: Fewer such students enter charters, disproportionate numbers of 
them exit charters after they are enrolled, or across-sector differences in the likelihood that a student 
is classified into or out of special education.  
 
Much of the research on special education gaps has thus far focused on enrollment patterns, with 
particular attention paid to whether charter schools explicitly or implicitly prohibit students with 
special needs from entering charters (Ramanathan & Zollers, 1999; Zollers & Ramanathan, 1998) or 
the degree to which charters “counsel out” students with needs (McKinney, 1998; Rothstein, 1998; 
Zollers, 2000). Anecdotally, it appears instances of “counseling out,” or attempts to counsel out, 
have occurred, particularly with regard to students with severe needs (Meyer, 2009). However, to 
date, evidence about systematic discriminatory practices remains largely absent, and the very few 
studies draw contradictory conclusions. Rhim, Lange, Ahearn, and McLaughlin (2007), for example, 
surveyed charter school authorizers—rather than charter schools themselves—and reported that the 
IEP document, which serves as the basis for receiving special services by students, is often used as 
the primary source to “counsel out” students from enrolling in charter schools. After reviewing the 
IEP, the charter school determines if the school is an appropriate placement for the student, and 
many charters reportedly advise parents to find a different option to serve their child’s needs. In 
contrast, Estes (2004) found no evidence that the charter schools she studied discriminated against 
students with disabilities as part of the enrollment process. 
 
To date, research has found little evidence to suggest that students with disabilities are 
disproportionately likely to exit out of charter schools relative to traditional public schools. In fact, 
research on charter schools in New York City (New York City Independent Budget Office, 2015; 
Winters, 2013) and Denver (Winters, 2015b) found that students with disabilities are significantly 
less likely to exit their school if it is a charter than if it is a district school. Nichols-Barrer, Gleason, 
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Gill, and Tuttle (2016) found similar results in a national evaluation of the Knowledge is Power 
Program (KIPP) charter schools.   
 
The final potential factor influencing the special education enrollment gap–differential patterns of 
classification changes–has thus far received very little attention in the academic literature. This paper 
attempts to address this important void in the charter school literature.   
 
As discussed in greater detail below, identification is the process by which students are designated to 
receive special education services. Using various forms of data, a team of educators meets with 
parents to determine if a student has an identifiable disability and if so how the needs associated 
with the disability will be addressed. As this description implies, it is a process with a certain amount 
of subjectivity. Consequently, in one school a student may be identified as requiring special 
education services, while in a different school that same student may not be so identified.  
 
Whether attending a charter school impacts the probability that a student is placed into special 
education has important policy implications. Evidence of special education gaps have led to policy 
decisions that are sweeping in nature but may be ill-designed. In New York, for example, state 
lawmakers amended the New York State Charter Schools Act in 2010 to include enrollment targets 
for particular student groups. According to the amended law, charter school authorizers must set 
enrollment and retention targets for students with disabilities. Yet, if a significant part of the gap 
results from the ability of charters to educate students without classifying them as special education, 
then policy efforts meant to increase the percentage of students in charters with special education 
status could lead to unnecessary disability classifications within the charter sector (Lake, 2014). In 
addition, if it is the case that charter schools can educate students effectively without the special 
education classification, it compels one to ask if there are lessons to be learned from the charter 
sector that could reduce the need to classify students into special education. Similarly, it may also 
suggest that district schools could be over-identifying students in need of special education. If so, 
then policy prescriptions aimed at charter schools may be focused on the wrong sector and the 
wrong problem.  
 
There are at least two reasons we might suspect that attending a charter school could reduce the 
probability that a student is placed into special education. First, it is possible that charter schools 
tend to prefer to educate students in regular enrollment environments to a greater extent than do 
district schools and thus will tend not to classify marginal students. The motivation may be cost—
students with disabilities can be costlier to educate (Haveman & Wolfe, 2000; Perna, 2015; Sladea et 
al., 2009) and charters often operate with comparably fewer fiscal resources (Speakman & Hassel, 
2005). Relatedly, charters may avoid IEP classifications because, as Barkmeier (2012) notes, many 
charter schools lack special education personnel and the resources to hire them. Moreover, due to 
their autonomous structure, many charter schools may be isolated from the "economies of scale" 
present in a traditional public school system, such as exchanges of teachers, materials, ideas and 
other resources. Second, in areas where charter schools are more effective at educating students than 
are surrounding district schools it is possible that students who would have fallen behind in a district 
school and eventually classified as having a mild learning disability would not be so identified when 
they attend a charter school.  
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To our knowledge, only one empirical paper to date has evaluated the relative proclivity of charter 
and district schools to place students in special education. Setren (2015) took advantage of 
enrollment lotteries in Boston and found that among those who applied to charter schools in pre-k 
or kindergarten, students randomly offered a charter school seat were less likely to be classified into 
special education by enrollment in October than were those who were not offered a seat. That 
differences in special education classification rates exist in the fall of the first enrolled year, prior to 
receipt of much instruction, is consistent with the idea that charters might have a stronger 
preference than do traditional public schools to serve such students in regular enrollment 
environments. She also found that students attending charters were more likely over time to be 
moved into less restrictive special education environments or to be declassified out of special 
education over time. This result is consistent with the idea that increased school effectiveness might 
play a role in the classification differences in the charter and traditional public school sectors.  
 
We build upon this early research using data from Denver, Colorado. In particular, we ask: Does 
attending a charter elementary school in Denver reduce the likelihood that a student entering 
kindergarten is identified as requiring special education services in early elementary grades? In 
addition, are there differences in this relationship by particular disability classifications? 
 
To address these questions, we take advantage of a unique administrative dataset. In particular, our 
identification strategy relies on information from the city’s common enrollment system (CES), 
which allows us to observe each school that a student listed as a preference for enrollment. We 
argue that this information allows us to hold constant unobserved student factors in a way not 
available in previous observational analyses of charter school impacts.  
 
Our findings suggest that attending a Denver charter school significantly and substantially decreases 
the likelihood that a student is classified as having a specific learning disability (SLD), which is not 
only the largest special education category but also the mildest and most subjectively diagnosed. We 
fail to find similar impacts for a more severe disability category (autism) or in a category that is more 
objectively diagnosed (speech or language impairment).  
 
Our estimates are, of course, specific to the context of Denver’s school system. This is a limitation 
given that, as described in later sections, Denver’s charter sector is somewhat atypical in its 
effectiveness and the degree to which charters have agreed to meet enrollment targets for students 
with special needs. Nonetheless, we present that our results are highly informative to the policy 
conversation. 
 
First, to the extent that our results could be driven by the academic effectiveness of Denver’s charter 
schools relative to its traditional public schools they would be applicable to other areas with effective 
charter sectors. Though the literature suggests that charter schools nationwide are equally effective 
as surrounding traditional public schools, some recent evidence finds benefits from attending urban 
charter schools in particular (CREDO 2015; Angrist, Pathak, and Walters 2013). For instance, 
among the 41 urban regions studied by CREDO (2015) 25 were found to have statistically 
significant positive impacts in math and 23 had significant positive impacts in reading. In both 
subjects, the positive impact found for Denver in that study was similar to the average effect of 
attending an urban charter school nationwide. That our results from Denver are consistent with 
findings from Boston (Setren 2015), another charter sector that research finds to be effective, 
suggests the potential for a pattern worthy of further research.  
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Further, our results may become more generalizable as schools and districts adopt policies that are 
similar to Denver’s approach. In fact, Denver is seen as an exemplar by some policymakers and 
pundits (see for example, Osborn 2015).   
 
Finally, our results are of policy importance if only because they provide additional evidence 
regarding the malleability of special education classifications. Our results add to other recent 
evidence that an intervention with positive academic effects reduces the likelihood that a student is 
later classified into special education (Maschkin, Ladd, and Dodge 2015). That interventions such as 
early childhood initiatives or attending a charter school can influence the likelihood that a student is 
identified as having an SLD suggests that, one way or another, these placements are related to more 
than just the incidence of an observable disability. Taken seriously, that result could have important 
ramifications for policymakers interested in special education. 
 
Special Education Identification 
 
Under the IDEA, public schools (including charter schools) are required to provide students with 
disabilities a free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment possible. 
Doing so generally requires first identifying if a student has a disability and if so classifying the 
specific disability. This is followed by the creation of a plan—called an Individualized Education 
Plan (IEP)—to provide the services necessary to help the student succeed academically, physically, 
socially, occupationally, or in whatever other domain is identified.   
 
There are several steps involved in classifying a student’s disability. First, a parent or educator 
requests an evaluation, conducted by a district expert, which includes a social history for the child, 
observations of the student, and any necessary testing. A team of professionals and the parent then 
meet to determine whether the student fits one of the eligible categories of a disability. If so, the 
team develops the IEP.  
 
The severity of disability varies both within and across categories. The designation of special 
education includes services provided to students with potentially severe mental disorders (e.g., 
intellectual disability, autism, traumatic brain injury); those with communication challenges (e.g., 
speech or language impairment); and those with emotional or behavioral disorders, physical 
disabilities (e.g., deaf, visual impairment, orthopedic impairment), or challenges in learning material 
(e.g., specific learning disability). Some categories have objective definitions and offer little discretion 
when classifying a student, while other categories rely heavily on subjective judgment and are 
influenced by the student’s previous academic performance. In particular, the classification of 
specific learning disability (SLD) is often believed to be primarily determined by low academic 
achievement (Macmillan & Siperstein, 2001).  
 
Prior to 2004, the process by which students were placed into special education for learning 
disabilities was based on an identified discrepancy between their IQ and academic performance 
(O’Donnell & Miller, 2011). Under the 2004 revision of IDEA, the federal government began 
recommending that states abandon the discrepancy model in favor of “response to intervention” 
(RTI), by which the school uses a progressive approach to assess whether the student responds to 
research-based general education interventions prior to classification into special education (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2006).  
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Generally, RTI uses a multi-tiered intervention approach to identify academically at-risk students 
(Carney & Stiefel, 2008). At Tier 1, all students are theoretically provided with quality, research-
based instruction in the general education setting. All students are assessed through classroom 
summative and formative assessments. Students observed to be underperforming relative to 
expectations with Tier I instruction can be identified to be provided with direct, explicit instruction 
in their academic area(s) of identified need in Tier II interventions. The instruction differs from 
classroom instruction in the intensity (teacher-student ratio), frequency (sessions per week), and 
duration (amount of time per session) of the instruction. Students’ response to instruction is 
monitored by their progress on obtaining proficiency in the identified low academic areas. A student 
who does not respond may participate in a different intervention, have the intensity, frequency, 
and/or duration changed, or be referred for a special education evaluation. Special education 
evaluations and services are typically Tier III of a three-tiered RTI system (Fuchs & Fuchs, 2006; 
Hughes & Dexter, 2011).  
 
Providing these descriptions of the classification process is more than point of information; it 
supplies the necessary information to understand how identification is required by law in Colorado. 
Despite the 2004 IDEA changes, the adoption of RTI did not universally eliminate the use of the 
IQ discrepancy model in the United States. Methods of special education identification and 
classification vary across states and school districts. This is because federal law left to the states the 
autonomy to decide how to determine special education eligibility. Only seven states—Colorado, 
Connecticut, Idaho, Florida, Louisiana, Rhode Island, and West Virginia—prohibit the use of the 
severe discrepancy model, either through laws or guidelines, allowing only RTI as the methodology 
for identification. Colorado began requiring the exclusive use of RTI beginning with the 2009-2010 
school year. However, the method by which RTI is to be implemented is provided in the form of 
guidelines rather than binding stipulations, meaning schools are left to decide, for example, the total 
number of weeks for an intervention, the intensity or frequency of interventions, screening and 
progress monitoring, and the classification of students into special education (Lemmond, 2016).  
 
RTI was designed, in part, to reduce the number of special education identifications by facilitating 
pre-IEP interventions (Al Otaiba, Wagner, & Miller, 2014; Fuchs & Fuchs, 2009; Fuchs & Vaughn, 
2012; Kavale, 2005).1 Some research suggests it has had such an effect (Marston, Muyskens, Lau, & 
Canter, 2003; McNamara, 1998; McNamara & Hollinger, 2003; Sornson, Frost, & Burns, 2004), 
although a recent policy analysis suggests that on at least a macro level, special identification after 
RTI has not decreased and in fact may be increasing in states that have mandated RTI (Lemmond, 
2016).  
 
For schools in DPS, Colorado’s RTI change was not the only policy alteration that may affect the 
proclivity to identify students for special education. In 2009, DPS created the Task Force on Special 
Education in Autonomous Schools, which presented recommendations to the DPS board on how 
to address the special education gap (Meyer, 2009; Meyer & Hubbard, 2009). Based on those 
recommendations, DPS in 2010 joined more than 20 other public school districts across the country 
that entered into “compacts” with charters (Whitmire, 2014). Among other things, the Denver 
                                                          
1 RTI was also instituted in response to criticisms of the discrepancy model that included bias (Gaviria-Soto & 
Castro-Morera, 2005), imprecision (O’Donnell & Miller, 2011; Reid, 2015; Reschly, 2002), a “waiting to fail” 
approach (Reynolds & Shaywitz, 2009), and over-identification of students into special education (Batsche, Kavale, 
& Kovaleski, 2006; Kavale, 2005).  
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compact required charters to serve a larger percentage of special education students by hosting 
centers specializing in autism, emotional disturbance, and cognitive delay, with a target of serving 
15% of the district’s students with significant needs (AP, 2012; Robles, 2010; Zubrzycki, 2015). In 
return, charters were granted access to DPS facilities and were provided greater resources, such as 
personnel, specialized training, and funding (AP, 2012; Meyer, 2010; Whitmire, 2014).  
 
Prior to the compact, no charter school in Denver operated a center-based program (Meyer, 2009). 
By 2015, nine charter schools enrolled 58 students in K-12 center programs. That was out of 132 
centers in district and charter schools combined, serving approximately 1,300 students (Zubrzycki, 
2015). In 2016, 15 charters were to have programs for an estimated 107 students. The target for 
2020 is 40 charter school centers serving 300 students (Zubrzycki, 2015).  
 
Methods 
 
Study Context 
 
To examine the study’s questions, we used data provided by DPS covering fall 2012 through fall 
2015. During that time, DPS educated approximately 80,000 students, around 9,000 of those in 
charter schools (Barkmeier, 2012).  
 
Charter schools have a long history in Denver, going back to the early years of charters in the state. 
Although the relationship between the district and charters was initially adversarial, DPS now 
encourages the formation of charters through its Office of School Reform and Innovation 
(http://osri.dpsk12.org/), fulfills its authorizer role by holding charter schools accountable to 
performance metrics and their contracts (http://osri.dpsk12.org/quality-assurance-accountability/), 
and promotes charter schools among its other schools when enabling parents to choose their 
children’s schools (http://osri.dpsk12.org/about-osri/parent-resources/). 
 
The method by which parents choose schools in Denver is a CES. Through the CES, parents can 
choose either a traditional public school (TPS) or a charter school through a single online or paper 
application (Gross & Denice, 2015). The process is designed to optimally match students to their 
preferred school in a way that is efficient, equitable, and transparent. Each spring, parents are given 
an opportunity to state their preference for where their child attends school in the fall. Parents can 
select up to five choices, including both charter schools and TPS (Klute, 2012). They fill out a 
common form that is returned to the central administration office. 
 
Schools also list preference categories, for instance for siblings of current students or for students 
who reside within a targeted neighborhood. Students are matched to schools according to where 
they fall within the school’s preference categories. If there are more available seats after filling all 
students classified within the first preference level, then the algorithm matches students in the 
second school preference category, and so on. When there are more students within the school 
preference category being matched than are available seats within the school, students within that 
preference category are assigned randomly. The student is assigned to attend his highest preferred 
school to which the process matches him. 
 
Parents can use the system in any grade level, or they can forego the system entirely and allow their 
child to be assigned to a school, usually based on neighborhood. Once enrolled in a school, parents 
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do not have to use the system again for their child to remain in that school (i.e., reapply to the same 
school each year).  
 
Among those who were initially assigned by the algorithm to attend a charter school in the two entry 
cohorts analyzed, 86 percent actually attended that school. That number is comparable to the 85 
percent of students who enrolled in their initially assigned district school.   
 
The special education gap in Denver.  
 
Specific to special education enrollment in Denver, Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of district and 
charter school students classified as requiring special education services by grade overall and for 
particular classifications of interest.2 Clearly, there is a small overall special education gap between 
school sectors when students enter kindergarten. This early gap is driven largely by the category of 
speech or language disability. However, the gap in speech and language declines to the point of 
nonexistence as early as four years later, when students are in third grade. Meanwhile, the overall 
special education gap grows largely because students in TPSs are more likely to be classified as 
having a SLD in later grades than are students in charter schools. 
 
The figure suggests that the special education gap is largely driven by the category of SLD. However, 
such a descriptive analysis is not able to determine whether or the extent to which the 
disproportionate growth in the SLD category within the district sector is due to differences in the 
likelihood that a student would receive the classification in the charter sector or if it is due to 
differences in the type of student attending each sector.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Sample, Data, and Variables 
 
The study sample included almost 12,000 students in charter and TPS. The sample was limited only 
to students who entered kindergarten in fall 2012 or fall 2013, which means that the third grade is 
the highest grade we observe. We limited the data in this way because a preliminary descriptive 
analysis indicated the overwhelmingly large proportion of special education classifications occurred 
before middle and high school. The smattering of identifications in secondary grades would have 
made any analysis at those levels meaningless in its implication. In order to focus on new special 
education classifications, we restrict the estimation sample to include only students who did not have 
an IEP when they entered kindergarten. Results are qualitatively similar when the sample is 
expanded to include all kindergarten entrants. 
 
The dataset includes demographic and classification information for the universe of students 
enrolled in Denver district and charter schools. It also includes information from the city’s CES. For 
each student, we observe each school listed as one of the potential five preferences, with the order 
of the preference. We can then use a unique school identifier to determine whether a listed preferred 
school is a charter.  
 
                                                          
2 Similar figures appear in Winters, 2015a. See that article for a more detailed breakdown of the special education gap in 
Denver and New York City over time. 
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As Table 1 indicates, around 8% of the entire sample had an IEP when they entered kindergarten. 
The table disaggregates descriptive statistics based on whether families chose a charter school during 
common enrollment and whether a student started in a charter school in kindergarten. Differences 
between groups are measured with simple t-tests. Student characteristics are measured as of the 
kindergarten entry year. As indicated, the differences in the percentages of students with IEP 
classifications are small based on school status, meaning there appears to be no meaningful gap in 
the overall percentage of students with special needs based on school type at entry.    
 
As for other student characteristics, there are some notable differences between the two school 
sectors (see the final two columns of Table 1). A greater percentage of those who start in charter 
schools are identified as English as a Second Language, are African American, and qualify for the 
reduced lunch program. Conversely, greater percentages of students in TPS qualify for the free 
lunch program and are classified as bilingual. In other respects—such as gender and other categories 
of race ethnicity—the two groups are statistically equivalent.  
 
For the first research question, the dependent variable was an indicator for whether a student was 
classified as special education as of fall 2015. For the second research question, we disaggregated the 
IEP classification into disability categories of SLD, speech and language, and autism. This enabled 
us to measure whether there was a difference in the likelihood of being classified into particular 
disability categories based on type of school.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]  
 
Identification Strategy 
 
The preferred method for measuring the impact of charter schools on educational outcomes is to 
take advantage of enrollment lotteries to implement a randomized design. Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, 
Narita, and Pathak (2015), for example, present a way to use randomness within Denver’s CES to 
produce causal estimates of charter school effects.  
 
Unfortunately, a randomized design is not available for the present study. As mentioned above, 
because new IEP classifications occur almost exclusively in early elementary grades, our sample is 
restricted to include only new kindergarten entrants. There were only eleven charter schools serving 
kindergarten during this time. Further, Denver’s CES structure leads only a small minority of 
students who applied to be truly randomly assigned a seat. In contrast, although they also study 
Denver, Abdulkadiroglu, et al.’s (2015) randomized control trial analysis of the impact of charter 
schooling on student test scores incorporates any student entering a charter school in grades four 
through ten, which substantially increases the number of available observations and thus improves 
statistical power. That receipt of a new IEP only occurs for some students, unlike changes in 
standardized test scores, only exacerbates the need for additional observations in order to detect 
meaningful effects.  
 
We thus employed an observational approach. Prior within-study comparisons—all focused on 
achievement rather than classification rates—suggest that estimated charter school impacts using 
matching or well-controlled observational designs closely approximate those from randomized field 
trials (see for instance Angrist, Pathak, & Walters, 2013; Abdulkadiroğlu, Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, & 
Pathak, 2011; Fortson, Verbitsky-Savitz, Kopa, & Gleason, 2012).  Further, we argue that the unique 
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data in Denver allows us to improve considerably upon prior attempts to control for the differences 
between students attending charter and district schools directly.  
 
In simple terms, our strategy is to take advantage of the information about student schooling 
preferences revealed by the CES in order to control for a greater number of unobserved differences 
between charter and district school students than possible in prior observational studies. The 
analysis may not be based on random assignment, but it is a significant improvement over standard 
observational techniques and under reasonable assumptions should produce causal estimates. As 
pointed out by Barnow, Goldberger, and Cain (1981), even in an observational setting, 
“Unbiasedness is attainable when the variables that determined the assignment rule are known, 
quantified, and included in the [regression] equation.” As guided by that observation, our approach 
is similar in spirit to that used by Dale and Krueger (2002), who studied the wage effects of 
attending a selective college. 
 
The fundamental problem with comparing the observed differences in outcomes among those who 
attend charter and district schools is that we have reason to suspect that factors unobserved by the 
researcher are related both to the outcomes and the likelihood that students enroll in a charter 
school. In particular, the decision to apply to a charter school is likely complex and related to factors 
that are not present in administrative datasets.  
 
At least some prior observational analyses of charter schools have failed to adequately account for 
such unobserved factors related to both applying to a charter and later outcomes because the 
administrative datasets they accessed observed only whether students actually enrolled in a charter or 
a district school. Denver, however, adopted the CES beginning in fall 2012, and as a consequence 
our dataset allows us to observe not only the school that the student attended, but also each school 
that the student listed as a preference. That is, we are able to observe the student’s decision whether 
or not to apply to each Denver school. Thus while there remain many variables that we do not 
observe that are related to both applying to a charter school and the outcome of interest, we do 
directly observe whether or not the student considered the charter school to be a desirable option. 
We argue that the Denver dataset thus allows for a unique opportunity to account for unobserved 
differences between charter and district students directly.  
 
Students who apply to the same schools are likely to be similar in ways that are unobserved in the 
dataset. For instance, we might suspect that they are as likely to live nearby, and they clearly had the 
informational resources necessary to know that the charter school was available to them and perhaps 
a good fit for their child. By controlling for a series of dummy variables indicating each school the 
student listed as a preference we are able to account for a far greater proportion of unobserved 
differences between those attending charter and district schools than has been previously possible.  
 
In our case, the outcome of interest is whether the student was observed to have an IEP (or a 
specific IEP classification) as of fall 2015. Our basic model for estimation takes the form:  
 
(1) 𝐼𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗 + µ𝑖𝑗 
 
where IEP indicates whether the student is observed to have an IEP as of fall 2015, and δ is a series 
of dummy variables indicating whether the student listed a particular charter school as one of the 
five available preferences. That is, we employ separate dummy variables for each charter school to 
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which the student could have listed a preference that equals one if the student listed that school and 
zero otherwise. 3 The model additionally includes a dummy variable indicating whether the student 
first enrolled in kindergarten in fall 2012 or fall 2013 and an indicator for whether the student is 
observed in the second or third grade in fall 2015. To aid interpretation, we use OLS to estimate (1), 
resulting in a linear probability model. Results are similar when estimated via Probit.  
 
The coefficient of particular interest is β1, which represents the effect of attending a charter school 
in kindergarten on the probability that a student is classified as having an IEP by fall 2015. All 
students who entered a charter school in the fall of their kindergarten year have a value of 1 for the 
charter variable, whether or not they eventually left the sector during the time period of the analysis.  
 
The central assumption underlying estimation of (1) is that controlling for observed characteristics 
including the schools to which each student listed a preference accounts for unobserved differences 
between those who actually attend charter and district schools that are also related to the probability 
of IEP assignment.  
 
Results 
 
The results from estimating various versions of (4) are reported in Table 2. For these models, the 
table reports the estimated impact of enrolling in a charter school in kindergarten on the probability 
that a student is observed with a particular IEP classification as of fall 2015. All models are restricted 
to include only students who did not have an IEP classification when they entered kindergarten. 
Each column represents a different specification for accounting for school preferences or sample 
restriction. We estimate models that either control for an indicator for whether the student listed a 
preference for any charter school and also those that include an indicator for each charter school for 
which the student listed a preference. We also present models that include all students that entered 
kindergarten without an IEP and also those that restrict the sample to include only such students 
who listed at least one charter school preference. In the latter case, we do not report results for the 
probability of being classified as autistic because so few students in the more restricted sample 
received such a classification. 
 
We first consider the results for the impact of attending a charter school on the probability of 
having any IEP by fall 2015. In each case, the coefficient is negative, suggesting that attending a 
charter school reduces the likelihood of receiving an IEP by about 1 percentage point. For context, 
about 4.8 percent of students who did not begin in a charter had an IEP at this time.  
 
This result is statistically significant in the case when the sample includes all students who entered 
kindergarten without an IEP and the model includes an indicator for each charter school for which 
the student listed a preference. The coefficient is similar but the result becomes statistically 
                                                          
3 It would be possible to include dummy variables for each school. However, doing so significantly reduces the statistical 
power of the estimate. Further, that approach would effectively limit the comparison to students listing the exact same 
schooling preferences, which would not allow for enough variation in enrollment patterns in order to observe charter 
school effects.  
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insignificant, however, when the model is restricted to include only those who listed at least one 
charter school preference (p = 0.183 when school preference indicators are included).  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The analysis does find evidence that entering a charter school in kindergarten significantly reduces 
the likelihood that a student is classified as SLD. The most restrictive analysis finds that entering a 
charter reduced the likelihood of having an SLD classification by fall 2015 by about 2 percentage 
points. For context, only about 2.4 percent of students who started in a district school and entered 
without an IEP in kindergarten were observed with an SLD classification that year. In contrast, we 
find no evidence that entering a charter school in kindergarten was related to a differential 
probability of classification as autistic or having a speech or language impairment.  
 
Table 3 reports results from regressions broken out by particular subgroups. For space 
considerations, the table only reports results from models that include students who listed at least 
one charter school preference and who began without an IEP. It also incorporates an indicator for 
each charter school to which the student applied. We do not report results for autism because there 
are not enough students to support estimation with the more restricted sample.   
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Interestingly, the results suggest some differential effects by subgroup. There is a statistically 
significant decline in the probability of receiving an IEP of any kind when enrolled in a charter 
school, and specifically a classification of SLD for female students, but not for male students. 
However, it is worth noting that for the overall IEP analysis restricted to male students the 
coefficient is negative and of a meaningful magnitude, but imprecisely estimated. Further, the impact 
of attending a charter school on IEP classifications is apparent for students who began kindergarten 
eligible for either free or reduced priced lunch, while students in neither of those categories were as 
likely to receive an IEP in either sector. In only one of the estimates on samples limited to students 
by race/ethnicity do we find a statistically significant relationship between charter attendance and 
classification. However, in all but one group (white students receiving any IEP) the coefficient is in 
the expected direction and of a similar magnitude as the overall estimate reported in Table 2. This 
suggests that the results by race/ethnicity are particularly influenced by the substantially smaller 
sample size, which influences the precision of the estimates.  
 
Discussion 
 
The results from this paper suggest that attending a charter school in Denver, Colorado does not 
impact the likelihood that a student is newly classified as autistic or having a speech or language 
disorder, but does reduce the likelihood that a student is classified as having a SLD in early 
elementary grades. Moreover, SLD is the category that drives the greatest share of the enrollment 
gap between charter and district schools, as shown in Figure 1. The results from this paper suggest 
that a meaningful part of the difference in the proportion of students in Denver district and charter 
schools who are classified as in special education is driven by differences in classification. That is, 
part of the reason for the charter school special education gap in Denver is that the same student is 
less likely to receive an IEP–particularly in the area of SLD–if she attends a charter rather than a 
district school.  
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That our results vary by student subgroups is an interesting finding deserving of further research. In 
particular, our finding that attending a charter school reduces the probability of IEP classification 
(both overall and for SLD) for those eligible for free or reduced priced lunch but not for other 
students is worthy of additional consideration. It is possible that the sectors treat lower income 
students differently when considering classification. Or, perhaps Denver’s charter schools are 
particularly effective for lower-income students, which could lead to a lower rate of classification for 
them in particular. As Farkas  (2003) notes, low income children often enter elementary school with 
lesser school readiness and consequently demonstrate flatter learning trajectories. This is often 
exacerbated by lower expectations and less demanding curricula. In subsequent years, the 
compounding deficits lead to IEP classifications. Charter schools like those present in Denver may 
disrupt this chain by focusing intensively on skill development among urban, disadvantaged children, 
thereby avoiding the IEP classification. Indeed, as Barr, Sadovnik, and Visconti (2006) note, charter 
proponents have long argued that they provide a more effective and efficient alternative for low-
income children, especially in urban areas. In Denver specifically, many of the district’s charter 
schools make it their mission to serve disadvantaged children through what has been called a “no 
excuses” approach (Angrist, Pathak, & Walters, 2013; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003).  
 
It is worth noting that our results are, strictly speaking, specific to attending a charter school in 
Denver. This is an important consideration given that there is reason to suspect that Denver’s is not 
the typical case. For instance, the adoption of the compact for serving students with disabilities 
suggests that Denver’s relationship to the district sector might differ than in other localities. Further, 
though prior research suggests that attending one of Denver’s charter schools leads to meaningful 
academic gains relative to attending a district school, charter school impacts in many other localities 
have not been as positive.  
 
Nonetheless, that our findings are similar to Setren’s (2015) results from Boston lends some 
confidence that the finding might hold generally, at least in localities with effective charter sectors. 
In that paper, Setren found that students randomly offered a charter school seat were (a) less likely 
to be classified into special education than were those who were not offered a seat and (b) more 
likely over time to be moved into less restrictive special education environments or to be declassified 
out of special education. Apart from analyzing another system, our unique contribution is to show 
that the impact of charter schooling on special education classification is particularly found in the 
category of SLD. Classifications such as autism and speech and language disorders are more 
objectively diagnosed (Tucker, 2014), and thus we might suspect they would not be influenced by 
factors other than the true presence of a disability. SLD, on the other hand, is the mildest and most 
subjectively diagnosed disability category and is heavily influenced by student academic 
performance. Thus, we would suspect if an educational intervention, such as school choice in the 
form of charter schooling, were to impact the likelihood of special education classification it would 
occur in the category of SLD. 
 
Indeed, this finding of malleability in SLD is entirely consistent with recent findings by Muschkin, 
Ladd, and Dodge (2015) that participation in an early childhood initiative in North Carolina 
decreased the probability that a student was later classified as requiring special education services. 
Winters & Green, (2011) likewise found that competition from a voucher program specifically 
serving students with disabilities reduced the likelihood that students were classified as SLD in 
Florida. Such results are important because they suggest that at least some special education 
placements under the current system are due to factors related to schooling and learning, not 
biology.  
13 
 
 
Our results are also important in what they suggest about recent policy changes in which charter 
schools are expected to set and meet enrollment targets for students with disabilities. If it is the case 
that charter schools, at least in some localities, classify fewer students as SLD because they are able 
to educate students effectively without the special education classification, then enrollment targets 
seem to create incentives to unnecessarily classify students as disabled (Lake, 2014). Doing so has 
the potential to create greater inefficiencies in the educational process—special education comes 
with significant fiscal and opportunity costs (Haveman & Wolfe, 2000; Perna, 2015; Sladea et al., 
2009)—and more profoundly has the potential to stigmatize a child unnecessarily (Harry & 
Klingner, 2014; Kauffman & Badar, 2013).  
 
Instead of crafting policies about enrollment targets, it may be more worthwhile to ask what lessons 
can be learned from the charter sector that could reduce the need to classify students into special 
education. Unfortunately, the analysis in this paper is not in a position to determine why charter 
attendance reduces the likelihood of SLD classification, but other research suggests it is possible that 
students in Denver’s charter schools perform better academically than they would otherwise, and 
this results in a lower probability of being classified as having a SLD.  
 
It may also be, as suggested by Setren (2015), that charters disproportionately prefer not to classify 
marginal students as learning disabled. Instead, they may prefer to provide intensive tutoring to help 
students catch up if they fall behind their peers academically. Or rather than labeling a child with 
severe behavior problems as “emotionally disturbed,” charters might create a strong set of 
schoolwide behavior norms and support their teachers’ use of highly effective classroom-
management techniques (Lake, 2014). 
 
Indeed, in recent experiments in Houston, Denver, and Chicago, Fryer (2014) implemented the five 
best practices of charter schools (Dobbie & Fryer, 2013)—increased time, better human capital, 
more student-level differentiation, frequent use of data to alter the scope and sequence of classroom 
instruction, and a culture of high expectations—to determine if such practices would affect student 
performance in underperforming TPS. Results suggest that charter school best practices can be used 
systematically in previously low-performing TPS to significantly increase student achievement in 
ways similar to the most achievement-increasing charter schools. Consequently, when considering 
gaps in special education enrollment between charters and TPS—gaps in the numbers of students 
with severe needs served notwithstanding—our findings suggest the focus may be better spent on 
whether TPS over-identify students with SLD (Artiles, Harry, Reschly, & Chinn, 2002; Harry & 
Klingner, 2014) rather than on whether charters discriminate.  
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
  
All Charter 
Request 
No Charter 
Request 
Started 
Kindergarten 
in Charter 
Did not Start 
Kindergarten 
in Charter 
IEP 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 
English as a Second Language 0.21 0.26 0.21*** 0.37 0.18*** 
Free Lunch 0.62 0.55 0.63*** 0.51 0.57* 
Reduced Lunch 0.07 0.08 0.07* 0.10 0.07* 
Bilingual 0.18 0.12 0.18*** 0.00 0.20*** 
African American 0.12 0.17 0.11*** 0.19 0.15* 
Indian 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Asian 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Hispanic 0.56 0.51 0.57*** 0.48 0.53 
Male 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.52 
n 11,948 1,181 10,767 486 695 
 
 
Note: T-tests are used to identify statistically significant differences between those who requested a charter and those 
that did not, and then to compare those who started kindergarten in a charter and those that did not. The comparison of 
those who did and did not begin kindergarten in a charter school is limited to include only those who listed at least one 
charter school preference. Student characteristics that can change over time – IEP, English as a Second Language, Free 
Lunch, Reduced Lunch, Bilingual – are as of the student’s entry into kindergarten.  
*p = .05, **p = .01, ***p = .001 
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Table 2: Regression Estimated Impact of Beginning Charter School in Kindergarten on Special 
Education Classification as of Fall 2015 
 
  Any IEP 
Coefficient -0.0233*** -0.00836 -0.0170** -0.0085 -0.0165 
Standard error [0.00841] [0.00587] [0.00843] [0.0136] [0.0123] 
    Specific Learning Disability 
Coefficient -0.0148*** -0.00654 -0.0130** -0.0162* -0.0213** 
Standard error [0.00459] [0.00441] [0.00591] [0.00864] [0.00903] 
  Autism 
Coefficient -0.00345* -0.000765 0.00013 N/A N/A 
Standard error [0.00198] [0.000761] [0.000494]     
  Speech or Language  
Coefficient 0.00401 -0.000351 -0.0027 0.0097 0.00503 
Standard error [0.00563] [0.00349] [0.00440] [0.00722] [0.00709] 
Indicator for Any Charter Request no yes no N/A N/A 
School Preference Specific Indicators no no yes no yes 
Sample 
All 
Kindergarten 
Entrants 
All 
Kindergarten 
Entrants 
All 
Kindergarten 
Entrants 
Listed at 
Least 1 
Charter 
School 
Preference 
Listed at Least 
1 Charter 
School 
Preference 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether the student had a particular special education classification as of 
fall 2015. Reported coefficient represents the effect of entering kindergarten in a charter school on the measured 
outcome. All samples include students who entered kindergarten in fall of 2012 or 2013 who did not have an IEP at 
time of entry. All models additionally include controls for entering cohort, grade level in fall of 2015, gender, 
race/ethnicity, status at time of kindergarten entry for whether bilingual, ESL, or eligible for free or reduced priced 
lunch. All models estimated via OLS. Robust standard errors clustered by 2015 enrolled school listed in brackets. *p = 
.05, **p = .01  
 
  
21 
 
 
0 
 
Table 3: Regression Estimated Impact of Beginning Charter School in Kindergarten on Special Education Classification as of Fall 2015, by 
Subgroup 
 
        
 Male Female FRL Not FRL White Black Hispanic 
        
Any IEP -0.00783 -0.0254 -0.0391** 0.00962 0.000931 -0.0175 -0.0248 
 [0.0188] [0.0174] [0.0165] [0.0182] [0.0269] [0.0254] [0.0173] 
        
SLD -0.0111 -0.0300** -0.0269** -0.0169 -0.0170 -0.00421 -0.0206* 
 [0.0126] [0.0143] [0.0130] [0.0144] [0.0158] [0.0271] [0.0123] 
        
Speech or Language 0.00329 0.00421 -0.00601 0.0214** 0.0230* -0.0116 -0.00108 
 [0.0139] [0.00450] [0.00904] [0.00810] [0.0135] [0.0104] [0.00946] 
        
Observations 549 556 685 420 281 181 556 
 
 
Note: Each cell represents the results of a separate regression. Rows label the dependent variable for the regression. Columns label the sample restriction. In total, table 
reports the results of 21 regressions – seven sample restrictions by three dependent variables. Dependent variable is an indicator for whether the student had a 
particular special education classification as of fall 2015. Reported coefficient represents the effect of entering kindergarten in a charter school on the measured 
outcome. All samples include students who entered kindergarten in fall of 2012 or 2013 who did not have an IEP at time of entry and who listed at least one charter 
school as a preference. All models include indicator variables for each charter school to which the student applied. All models additionally include controls for entering 
cohort, grade level in fall of 2015, gender, race/ethnicity, status at time of kindergarten entry for whether bilingual, ESL, or eligible for free or reduced priced lunch. All 
models estimated via OLS. Robust standard errors clustered by 2015 enrolled school listed in brackets. *p = .05, **p = .01  
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